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Abstract: In February 2017 I set out to explore the working conditions of ten animal welfare 
inspectors from two different county offices in Sweden. Reported as permeated with 
emotionally charged difficulties but never before researched from an emotion theoretical 
perspective, the daily work in animal welfare inspection calls for further investigation. 
Approximately ninety hours of shadowing and four interviews were conducted in order to 
understand the day-to-day work of inspectors and how it is managed emotionally. In this 
article, I argue that psychosocial stress and epistemic tensions (frustrations concerning 
clashing knowledge) are two central challenges for inspectors. Thereto, a new analytical 
concept, empathy work, is constructed in order to understand how inspectors work with 
empathy when approaching these challenges and pursuing animal welfare goals. In addition, 
bureaucratic procedures and ventilation are identified as crucial emotion management 
techniques relating to empathy work. 
 
Key words: empathy work; animal welfare inspection; emotion work; emotion management; 
psychosocial stress; epistemic tensions; bureaucratic procedures; ventilation. 
Introduction 
Situated inbetween animals, humans and law, animal welfare inspectors in Sweden have for 
many years been exposed to difficult and demanding working conditions (e.g. Andersson, 
2015; Thedin, 2013; Westergård, 2013). In one region the police have been reported to 
educate inspectors in self-defense techniques due to their encounters with threats and violence 
(Jersenius, 2013). From these reports, animal welfare inspection seems to be infused with 
emotion and tension. Yet, to date there are only a few studies that have researched dilemmas 
in animal welfare inspection and no research that have studied how emotion and tension are 
managed by inspectors. In this article my aim is to explore the working conditions of animal 
welfare inspectors in order to analyze the role of emotions and how inspectors manage these. I 
argue that empathy work (emotion work and management by empathy) is performed in 
relation to animals and humans by inspectors in their pursuit of making the situation better for 
animals. Bureaucratic procedures and ventilation helps us understand how inspectors uphold 
empathy work and stay professional despite the continuous challenges they are confronted 
with. 
Swedish animal welfare inspection is practiced on county government level under the 
board of agriculture. Thus, the animal welfare offices spread around Sweden could be viewed 
as authority exercising organizations operating in a bureaucratic manner. In recent years, a 
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large number of studies have researched emotions in bureaucratic authority and judiciary 
practicing organizations (e.g. Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2016; Larsson, 2014; Wettergren, 
2010). These, and previous major works in the field of sociology of emotions (e.g. Barbalet, 
2011; Hochschild, 1983; Sieben & Wettergren, 2010), have provided both theoretically and 
empirically motivated arguments that reason and emotions are intertwined and mutually 
dependent. But also that emotion, and the management of them, is a crucial aspect of 
professionalism in vastly different professions.  
From this premise, my aim is to contribute to the knowledge on animal welfare 
inspection in new empirical, methodological and theoretical ways. Empirically, the study is 
motivated by what has been described as exposed and difficult working conditions for 
inspectors. Previous research mainly concerns inspections on farm animals; I have widened 
the empirical scope by including inspections on pets and other animals. Methodologically, 
this meant that a close and intense way of exploring the subject was called for. Shadowing 
both individuals and organizations made possible the collecting of dense empirical data that 
could illustrate emotional conditions and dilemmas in inspection. Theoretically, the analytical 
approaches of sociology of emotion have been used both in pre-existing forms but have also 
been shaped into new analytical tools to approach the complexities in animal welfare 
inspection. Thereto, inductive means have let new understandings emerge during the analysis. 
The following two research questions have been guiding the study: 1. How can one describe 
and understand the working conditions of animal welfare inspectors in Sweden? 2. How do 
animal welfare inspectors manage and work with emotions in relation to their working 
conditions? 
Previous research on animal welfare inspection and emotion management  
Animal welfare inspection 
Previous research on animal welfare inspection has raised several questions on the 
relationship between inspectors and animal owners. A recent Danish study, examining animal 
owners experiences of being inspected, provides a thematic overview of different perceptions 
of inspection (Anneberg et al., 2012). Farmers perceive inspections as both necessary and 
unfair; the data reveals mutual understanding amongst farmers and inspectors but also 
frustrations and concerns that farmers experience when inspected. Another Danish study 
examines inspectors experiences and analyzes the normative dilemma of whether inspections 
should be mainly judicially oriented and thus focused on law enforcement, if it should be 
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pedagogically oriented or whether it should include both of these approaches (Anneberg et al., 
2013). Several of the findings in the Danish studies are confirmed in my data. For example, 
when inspectors both try to motivate a change in animal owners poor care of their animals but 
at the same time are judicially bound to make them pay fees or costs of inspections, 
inspector’s experience that this has a backlash effect on animal owners motivation to make 
improvements for their animals.  
A quite recent study has explored the experience of inspection dilemmas by government 
veterinarians in Ireland (Devitt et al., 2014). The dilemmas form three main themes: “(1) 
defining professional parameters; (2) determining the appropriate response and (3) 
involvement versus detachment” (Devitt et al., 2014: 6–7). As I will present below, similar 
concerns reoccurred in my data. Notably, the Irish study mentions the role of empathy in 
animal welfare inspection but leaves the subject unexplored. 
My participants describe that empathy plays a central part in the emotional and practical 
aspects of inspection, this suggests that a general understanding of animal welfare inspection 
could benefit from a more thoroughly theorization on empathy than previously done. Apart 
from investigating the role of empathy and emotions, I also address the unexplored human-
animal relational dimension in inspection1, which my empirical data and arguments suggest 
play a substantial role in guiding the work of inspectors.  
Moral tensions in human-human and human-animal relations 
Jacobsson and Lindblom have argued that animal rights activists suffer from ”emotional stress 
that their norm-transgressions imply” (2013: 56). This phenomenon is the implication of the 
“recurring (or potential) clashes between activists’ moral ideals and existing societal norms 
[that] give rise to far-reaching emotional tensions and a continual need for emotion work” 
(Jacobsson & Lindblom, 2013: 56). Such tensions and their consequences have been explored 
from various angles in different norm transgressing practices of human-animal relations 
(Hansson & Jacobsson, 2014; Jacobsson & Lindblom, 2012, 2016; Lindblom & Jacobsson, 
2014). Notably, there are relevant and substantial differences between the role of the activist 
and the inspector. For example, inspectors are professional authority officials and thus not 
agents pursuing subjective moral ideals as in the case of activists (Jacobsson & Lindblom, 
2013: 59). However, my data suggests that there are also important similarities; some animal 
owners perceive the inspectors as moralists rather than caseworkers. Such perceptions become 
                                                
1 Drawing on previous research suggesting that humans can make themselves ”sensible” to animals in order to 
broaden the empathetic capability (e.g. Hansson & Jacobsson, 2014). 
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a foundation for moral and epistemic tensions between the inspectors and the inspected 
animal owners.  
Holmberg (2008, 2011) has researched professionals working with animal 
experimentation and shows the moral and emotional complexities in human-animal relations. 
Holmberg argues that working with animals involves a great deal of “empathy and attention” 
but at the same time clear power relations that differentiate the stakes between animals and 
humans significantly (Holmberg, 2011: 151). That is, even if human empathy and attention 
acknowledges animals as beings with needs and capabilities to feel and suffer, animals are 
still treated bad and get killed in ways that never would be accepted if they were human. Even 
though this relational difference exist, animal welfare inspectors, just like the participants in 
Holmberg’s studies, perform empathy (2011: 160) and learn how to get “a feeling for the 
animal” (2008) in order to deal practically and emotionally with a case. Holmberg only 
briefly mentions empathy but at the same time implicitly shows its importance in 
understanding human-animal relations. The analysis presented in this paper fills a gap by 
looking closer at professional empathy in human–animal relations. 
Emotion management in bureaucratic organizations  
Wettergren has analyzed emotion management in the Swedish migration board and shows that 
its bureaucratic emotional regime is constituted by procedural correctness meaning that 
“correct procedure overrides personal emotions”(2010: 408) implying professionalism by a 
certain code of feeling and expression rules (2010: 409). Arguably, such emotional regimes 
enable the containing of personal emotions that contradicts the rationale of the bureaucratic 
procedures. That is, instead of feeling sad for the faith of a client one feels pride in being 
professional or correct in relation to the case. This is the bureaucratic ”override” of emotions; 
the performance of procedural correctness is a way of negotiating feelings by justification in 
relation to the rules of a specific procedure in work. 
Arguably, the county government’s animal welfare offices are bureaucratic 
organizations as the migration board. The offices operate by bureaucratic structures such as 
top-down handled rules and roles, labor division, a hierarchical organization and guiding 
policies from which certain procedures follow (Weber, 1949: 196–197). These similarities 
imply that studying emotions in animal welfare offices could benefit from the theorizing 
presented by Wettergren. However, to my knowledge no such studies have been conducted. 
Neither have I found any studies on animal welfare protection with an emotion sociological or 
social psychological approach. At the same time I argue that previous research have left 
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questions suggesting that understanding the practices of animal welfare inspection could 
benefit from emotion and empathy theories and therefore this study have aimed to answer this 
call.  
Theory 
Emotion management and emotion work 
The theoretical framework guiding this study draws on the empirically supported analysis that 
emotions are not just part of rationality but might even be viewed as crucial for rational action 
(e.g. Hopkins, Kleres, Flam, et al., 2009; Kemper, 1978; Turner & Stets, 2006) and further, 
“that emotion and reason are mutually dependent and informed by one another” (Wettergren 
& Bergman Blix, 2016: 22). More specifically, emotions informs and navigates cognition and 
rationality towards action (Wettergren & Bergman Blix, 2016: 22). However, the opposite 
function applies also; cognition can guide emotions by norms on emotional responses and 
their expression, theorized as feeling and display rules, where the former guides what one 
ought to feel and the latter how one ought to express the feeling (Hochschild, 2012). These 
rules could be seen as constructed and shaped in social interaction. In Barbalet’s words: 
“emotional experiences are […] shaped by the reactions of others to them” (Barbalet, 2011: 
42).  
In relation to the previous research discussed above one might ask: how are tensions in 
the inspector-inspected relation managed? A number of analytical tools have been developed 
that could be used to close in on this question. The concept of ventilation can help us 
understand how emotions can be managed when there is a ”need to give vent to built-up 
tension and irritation” (Jacobsson & Lindblom, 2013: 61). I argue that ventilation is relevant 
to understand informal and formal de-briefing and consultation in professions where 
emotional tension is part of the day-to-day tasks. The specific appliance of ventilation in my 
study will be put forward in the analysis and exemplified with empirical data. 
A further relevant concept is containing as theorized by McWilliams (2004: 146) and 
further developed by Jacobsson and Lindblom (2013, 2016). Containing implies that one 
“creates space in which it is possible for the person to tell the truth of his or her experience” 
(McWilliams, 2004: 134). Accordingly, in relation to my empirical data, the inspector has to 
be the space for the emotional reactions of the inspected (compare with: Jacobsson & 
Lindblom, 2013: 60). This understanding will be further exemplified and argued for in the 
analysis and it also needs to be clarified in relation to another major concept used in the 
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analysis, namely, empathy. This since, in my understanding, ventilation and containing are 
pre-conditions for professional empathy but also specific ways to manage the emotional 
tensions that such professionalism implies for the inspectors, not least in relation to the power 
aspects of inspection. 
Empathy  
Except for the professional/private difference between activists and inspector that have been 
discussed above, power is supposedly the most noteworthy difference. Inspectors are almost 
exclusively in a power position in relation to the inspected since they have judicial authority 
to initiate the enforcement of laws if the inspected does not comply with the regulations. This 
is a further cause of tension during inspections. Such dilemmas have previously been 
analyzed in relation to the notion of empathy. Before giving examples on such analyses, I will 
define the guiding understanding of empathy by elaborating on the following quote: 
Empathy is an emotional response (affective), dependent upon the interaction between trait 
capacities and state influences. Empathic processes are automatically elicited but are also shaped 
by top-down control processes. The resulting emotion is similar to one’s perception (directly 
experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy). (Cuff et al., 2016, p. 150)  
By this definition I understand empathy to be a capability that can be developed and 
cultivated by training through subjective cognitive processes and structurally through social 
interaction in an empathic climate. I also understand empathy as a situational phenomenon 
that needs to be contextualized in order to be understood (Hodges & Wegner, 1997; Rogers, 
1975: 6). A clear distinction between empathy and sympathy renders the former as “feeling 
as” while sympathy implies ”feeling for”(Hein & Singer, 2008: 157). That is, empathy is the 
ability to relate to or produce the same emotions as another and thus understand another’s 
situation. Sympathy instead has to do with adding an emotional reaction to empathy; for 
example, to emphatically acknowledge the anxiousness of an individual and feel pity 
(sympathize) for him/her.  
To consciously cultivate empathy has to do with transcending the partially automatic 
nature of empathy: “empathy is partly an automatic response, it is also cognitively regulated 
and managed” (Wettergren & Bergman Blix, 2016: 22). In my reading, this implies that 
empathy can be managed and worked with in various ways. Accordingly, I wish to name the 
managing of emotions and cognitive responses by empathy as empathy work2, which could be 
                                                
2 Empathy work have previously been briefly mentioned and used descriptively by prosecutors as shown in a 
study by Wettergren and Bergman Blix (2016: 28). In this article, the concept will be developed and used 
analytically. 
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seen as a professional resource that is used to achieve given goals. This concept will be 
developed in relation to the empirical data below.  
In their research on emotions in the judiciary, Bergman Blix and Wettergren (2016) 
have shown how judges use empathy in various ways to manage emotions in relation to 
subjects in court. In the same way that one judge is shown to use empathy when being patient 
and listening to arbitrary explanations by a defendant (Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2016: 
35), the inspectors in my study have to balance their power and expected impartiality by 
empathy which implies letting the inspected make themselves heard. This connects to the 
concept containing discussed above. Letting the inspected be heard can imply that inspectors 
have to contain: be the space for the frustrations of animal owners.   
In another study by Wettergren and Bergman Blix (2016), previous research on the use 
of empathy in legal process’ (Booth, 2012; Henderson, 1986) is further developed when 
studying empathy in the work of Swedish prosecutors. The study shows how empathy is used 
both to understand a case, prepare for trial and managing various situations during trial. Thus, 
empathy can be understood as a ”professional tool” (Wettergren & Bergman Blix, 2016: 30) 
that allows a subject, by role taking (registration of, but not feeling, the others emotion) or 
identification (experiencing the emotions of the other by feeling them), to understand another 
subjects emotions and situation (Wettergren & Bergman Blix, 2016: 31). In relation to the 
various understandings of empathy presented one might ask: how does empathy work with 
those whose capacity to verbally express their feelings and thoughts is limited or non-
existing? 
Björk (2017) have developed an approach to understand how parents’ empathetic 
imagination can guide their parenting role. Drawing on previous research suggesting that 
empathic understanding can be more or less accurate since it depends on the imaginative 
capabilities of the empathizer (Morton, 2013; Cuff et al, 2016), Björk argues that such 
capabilities are especially important in adult-child relations since children have lesser abilities 
to verbally communicate their feelings. Thus, the imagination of the adult becomes crucial in 
order to guide their empathy towards the child. Accordingly, I will argue and exemplify that 
the same empathetic imagination is of great essence in human-animal relations since animals 
like young children lack the ability to verbally communicate their feelings and needs. Further, 
I will argue and show how the empathetic imagination in animal welfare practice could be 
considered highly dependent on knowledge on animals’ behaviors and needs, knowledge that 
often becomes an object of tensions and paradoxes. 
The development and nurturing of empathy towards animals have been researched by 
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Hansson and Jacobsson who show how various conscious managing techniques can achieve a 
“”re-engineering” of affective cognitive repertoires and processes of “sensibilization” in 
relation to animals” (2014: 263). By consciously tuning in and making oneself sensible to 
animals’ situations and life conditions, one can cultivate a broader empathic capability 
extending human-human relations. As I have mentioned above, such cognitive processes of 
cultivating empathy are related to knowledge, which the experiences of the participants in my 
study confirm.  
Data and method 
The data presented and analyzed in this article was collected in February and March 2017 
with the aim of depicting and understanding the working conditions and emotion management 
and work of animal welfare inspectors in Sweden. To get a rich material, animal welfare 
offices from two different county governments were included. The initial contact was made 
through managers and selection came about by letting managers involve the inspectors that 
found interest in taking part in the study.  
To capture both the backstage and front stage emotion work of the inspectors as well as 
the subjectively narrated and the observational in-action perspective on their working 
conditions, a varied selection of ethnographic methods were applied to collect the data: 
shadowing, observations and interviews. A broad qualitative approach seemed necessary to 
capture the actual behaviors and emotions that arise during inspections and other work 
situations of animal welfare inspectors. The reason for this is because the gap between the 
subjectively narrated and observed emotions supposedly cannot be captured quantitatively. 
Approximately 90 hours were spent in the field. Shadowing and observations were conducted 
during around 20 inspections and a number of meetings and briefings in offices. Due to 
organizational and accessibility differences the amount of data and participants involved 
varied between the counties. In sum 9 participants (7 in one county and 2 in the other) were 
shadowed, sometimes individually and sometimes in pairs. In total, 4 participants were 
formally interviewed (2 in each county) of which 3 were shadowees. In one county, 
observations were conducted during meetings and office work and involved further 
participants than the shadowed ones. 
Shadowing and observations 
Shadowing implies that one follows a member of an organization closely in order to gather 
intense and detailed data on their activities (McDonald, 2005). By shadowing behavior from a 
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cognitive and emotional perspective, I intended to understand roles and perspectives by 
partially observe, partially letting the subjects describe their thoughts and feelings. For my 
purpose, being able to get first-hand accounts on what unfolds in the day-to-day activities of 
animal welfare inspectors is crucial in order to capture activities and emotions beyond 
narrated accounts; in Quinlan’s words: ”Data from shadowing are grounded in actual events 
rather than reconstructions of previously occurring events” (2008: 1482).  
The ontology guiding the method and theory is a constructivist one. Accordingly, the 
epistemological standpoint implies that the specific reality examined, and also the knowledge 
about it, ”is the result of an intersubjective construction between workers but also between 
them [the shadowees] and the shadower” (Meunier & Vasquez, 2008: 176). This is to say that 
I acknowledge that my presence and questions might alter and modify the behaviors and 
narratives when examined. However, I see this as an inescapable fact to acknowledge and 
consciously act upon rather than a problem to escape. The issues of observer effects in 
shadowing has been raised before and calls for attention (McDonald, 2005: 459). In my case, 
asking relatively non-guiding questions, keeping a very low profile during inspections and 
letting the narratives unfold uninterrupted have been the main strategies to be as 
”conspicuously invisible” (Quinlan, 2008) as possible. Further, there are suggestions that one 
might address and discuss the observer effect directly with the participants (Burgoyne & 
Hodgson, 1984; McDonald, 2005), an idea that I have continuously adopted during fieldwork. 
This by asking the participants if and in what way my presence was altering their work and 
the situations we experienced. Some inspectors said they forgot me during inspection, thus 
confirming that I managed the shadowing role sufficiently. When asked, all inspectors stated 
that my presence did not alter the inspections in any substantial way.  
A dialogical approach was adapted which recognized that ”the shadowee can provide 
clarification and interpretation.”(Gill et al., 2014: 72). This has meant that shadowee 
confirmation/disconfirmation of my observations is accounted for as crucial.  
Interviews 
The interviews, ranging between 45-60 minutes, were semi-structured with a thematic design 
including questions on emotions and related topics such as debriefing, collegial interaction 
and organizational aspects of working conditions. Three interviews were recorded by sound 
and transcribed and one interview was recorded by direct note taking. All interviews included 
spontaneous questions relating to the interpretations and answers given by the interviewees. 
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In addition to the formal interviews, all participants were asked questions during and in 
connection to shadowing and observational sessions.  
Ethics 
All participants were informed of the ethics and conditions of participation stating the 
unconditional permission to withdraw from involvement at any time, secured data treatment, 
anonymity measurements and terms of data usage. Because of the particularly sensitive and 
exposed nature of the participants’ situation, all names and details of the offices, participants 
and the inspection objects and subjects were coded already in the field notes. This 
precautionary measure can for example imply that quotes or a description of a particular event 
does not contain the accurate animal type. 
A specific ethical issue for shadowing and similar ethnographic methods arose 
immediately upon entering the field; the problem of forced consent. As previously 
problematized by shadowers, hierarchical organizational structures can be a problem when the 
manager-employee relation puts pressure on the employees consent (e.g. Bart Johnson, 2014: 
29). In my case, the field was accessed by seeking contact with managers that later invited me 
to meet the inspectors. Thus, I did not know if and to what extent participation were the result 
of organizational pressure. However, when presenting the study for the working group and 
managers I stressed that no one needed to take part and that everyone involved could just drop 
out at any time. I also asked inspectors one on one, in order to figure out whether their 
participation was voluntary and as far as I could tell, all inspectors involved seemed to be 
taking part out of their own will. 
When shadowing and observing inspections the inspectors usually informed the 
inspected beforehand on my role. But sometimes during non-prepared inspections or acute 
errands no such information could be handed in advance. Then the inspector or I verbally 
informed the inspected when we arrived at site. All participants gave their informed consent. 
Data Analysis 
The analytical approach to the empirical data was thematic content analysis that was partially 
theoretically deductive and partially inductive. This in the sense that some patterns were 
searched for with theoretical tools derived from previous emotion research while others 
emerged when reading the empirical data. For example, emotion work was pre-determined as 
an analytical category; one has to work with professional emotions according to the 
theoretical framework of this study. On the other hand, one of the most central themes of the 
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study came to be empathy, which was not planned beforehand but rather chosen during the 
analysis as it emerged as a central pattern.  
Coding was performed in three stages. First, I read the text several times in order to 
identify and saturate reoccurring patterns. Second, when no further patterns were found, I 
merged relating patterns into general themes. Third, I recoded the general themes into the 
analytical themes that are presented under each heading in the analysis. For example, the 
general theme empathy was recoded as empathy work, altruistic empathy and instrumental 
empathy. Further, expressed feelings of insufficiency were recoded as psychosocial stress.  
The working conditions of animal welfare inspectors  
In this section I will describe the day-to-day tasks and experiences of the animal welfare 
inspectors that I have followed. The descriptions serve as a background of information that 
situates and enriches the understanding of the specific empathy work and emotion 
management described below. Apart from being descriptive, this section is also analytical in 
the sense that it aims to identify the objects of empathy work and emotion management; that 
is, the conditions, situations and interactions that involves professional emotional responses in 
animal welfare inspection. Thus, in this section I attempt to answer the question: how can one 
describe and understand the working conditions of animal welfare inspectors in Sweden? 
The day-to-day animal welfare practice 
Sure, it has become tougher. But this image of our work…this image that we encounter misery and 
we are being threatened…well no, those are very exceptional cases. And those exceptional cases 
create a kind of hysteria. (John, 40+) 
The toughness of it and the amount of crap you have to put up against, that was difficult at first. 
(Jenny, 30+)   
These quotes exemplify quite different accounts of two experienced inspectors. And surely, 
the subjective attitudes towards working conditions and experiences differ. However, the 
bigger picture shows that inspectors share a lot of experiences that have in common the need 
for emotion management and work. This is a call for professionalism that was embraced by 
all participants with conscious sensibility and with the primary aim of making the life 
situations of animals better. 
The task of animal welfare inspectors is to make sure that animal owners follow the 
practical guidelines of the animal welfare legislation that are handed down from the board of 
agriculture. Inspectors divide their work hours between field and office work. The former 
generally fills out two days of a working week and the latter three days. The tasks of the 
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inspectors vary and imply different encounters that also differ in how professionally 
demanding they are perceived to be. The first, roughly drawn, difference is that between 
inspections concerning production animals (farm animals that produce foods and other 
products for human consumption; pigs, cows, poultry etc.) and pets (dogs, horses, cats etc.). 
The inspectors in my study generally have knowledge and experience to work with both kinds 
of inspections but are usually focused on a specific group – production or pet animals and 
occasionally laboratory animals and rare animals. Generally speaking, the inspectors working 
with pet animal inspection more often encounter people living on the margins of society. 
Whether it is health issues, addictions, mental disabilities, old age or other forms of social 
exclusion, this branch of inspection generally involves more human psychological suffering 
and, according to the collected image, also a greater deal of exposure to stress and challenging 
situations for the inspectors. The second difference in the day-to-day work of inspectors is 
between routine errands and reported non-compliances. Routine inspections, that mostly 
involves control of production animals but also pet shops, circuses, laboratories and other 
professional animal owners, are carried out by forewarn; the animal owner gets notice usually 
one day before inspection. Inspection of reported animal abuse and/or non-compliance of 
regulations are on the other hand carried out with no notice and therefore involves an element 
of surprise for the animal owner. Such inspections target both private and professional animal 
owners but according to my data much more often the former. Generally, inspections on 
reported non-compliances are more often concerned with social misery and animal owners 
with various forms of difficulties in their everyday life. Such inspections are perceived to be 
more demanding amongst participants. 
Psychosocial stress  
As mentioned, pet animal inspections generally come with greater challenges and exposure to 
psychosocial stress. Inspectors, both those specialized in production animals and in pet 
animals confirm this. Psychosocial stress refers to when challenging social conditions 
exhausts the psychological coping techniques of the inspectors and causes stress boosts 
(Compare with: Lazarus, 1966). Such stress is emotionally demanding for inspectors since it 
requires coping with the emotions of the animal owner, the suffering of the animals but not 
least their own emotional reactions. For example, the emotional demands on inspectors can 
have to do with staying calm and correct whilst animal owners are verbally aggressive. The 
demands can also have to do with witnessing the psychological suffering of animals without 
being able to intervene.  
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During a meeting I attended in one of the offices, psychosocial stress was discussed as a 
risk factor for inspectors in general but for pet animal-inspectors in particular. An experienced 
inspector working exclusively with pet animal inspections and often with cases described as 
“the toughest cases reported” explained her notion on the difference between working with 
production- and pet animal inspections: “I think it has become substantially tougher. We do 
not work with these production animals where you go to nice business owners who see a 
reason to take good care of their animals. We are going to a completely different clientele. We 
do have a tougher work environment.” Inspectors focusing on production animals also 
confirm this picture. In the words of another inspector, with a lot of experience in both 
production and pet animal inspection, when leaving the site of an acute errand: “I would much 
rather take a sharp discussion with a farmer than have to see this misery.” The inspector was 
referring to a site where particularly the animals, scratching themselves constantly, but also 
the humans that was living in sanitary nuisance, seemed to suffer. The accompanying 
veterinarian, brought in to examine the animals medicinally, walked around with a flashlight, 
examining the furs of each individual animal and found the scalps of all to be infested with 
countless crawling lice’s. The veterinarian looked astonished, shook her head and mumbled 
quietly: “ I have never seen anything like this in my career”. The stench from animal feces 
and the high levels of ammonia in the indoor air was hard to stand. One of the inspectors took 
a break during inspection to breath some fresh air. When leaving the site by driving slowly 
along a small dirt road with the house fading out in the rearview mirror, one of the inspectors, 
seemingly struck by the inspection, remarked: “The smell of her and of her animals” followed 
by silence, confirming the intensity of the experience.  
Even if not generally as intense as the inspection depicted above, many cases described 
by inspectors and captured in shadowing sessions witnessed of similar demanding cases 
concerning pet animals. For example, animal owners threatening to take their life and 
sometimes even demonstrating suicidal threats, animals found almost dead or dead due to 
starvation, animal owner’s scolding and verbally attacking inspectors etc. The experience-
based knowledge on the challenging circumstances of inspection can sometimes guide the 
inspectors’ workday, for instance during a midmorning while driving on an inspection round, 
when an inspector remarked: “We better visit them now so they do not become too rude. – 
What do you mean?, the accompanying colleague replied, – So that they do not do drugs 
before we get there”. Contrasting the harshness of the situations exemplified above, there are 
many inspectors that share the picture of their work as fun, exiting and pleasant. Further, 
 14 
generally inspectors share the notions that: “people are very willing to help” and that “the 
basic attitude is to trust citizens.”  
Epistemic Tensions 
Except from the psychosocial stress from implicit/explicit threats and witnessing of misery 
etc., my empirical data suggests that what could be called epistemic tensions are another 
central challenge in welfare inspection that needs emotional management. Epistemic tensions, 
I argue, arise in situations where inspectors’ knowledge and empathic capability do not cohere 
with the legislation and its practical implications or strongly contradict the knowledge of 
animal owners. For example, one inspector uttered her frustration after an inspection where 
the animals where tied up in the same place without being able to scratch their backs or move 
around more than a few steps for the whole winter season (approximately seven months): 
“My personal opinion is that it is better with loose housing, but both ways are equally ok 
according to the law.” She then continued: “It is all about tradition. What we regulate is the 
lowest level. I am over qualified; my knowledge is not always relevant. I know that the 
animals get better legs and hoofs if they can move freely.” Arguably, “It is all about tradition” 
refers to the arbitrariness of the legislation in relation to the knowledge of the inspector, in 
this case based on a university degree from five years of full time studies and additionally 
many years of experience and further education within animal welfare inspection. Even if the 
inspector practices the legislation so that farmers choosing to tie their animals for seven 
months a year get the same treatment as farmers applying “better” solutions for their animals, 
the frustration for the inspector is a fact, as this quote suggests: “one thinks, why do you not 
do this or that instead [use knowledge based solutions].” Similar utterances of frustration 
arose among many if not all participants. Here follows a few examples: “Damn dirty place, 
good to see something bad so you can compare [with places that have better animal welfare 
solutions].” “We are the lowest level that should be.” “Animal welfare rules are at very low 
level, lowest level.” These quotes exemplify frustrations of not being able to do enough 
because of the “toothless” legislation. 
Furthermore, epistemic tensions arise since the legislation is incoherent in relation to its 
aims; the legislation is formulated so that contemporary research on animal welfare renders it 
insufficient even viewed from its own incorporated aims. In this sense, the law is paradoxical. 
This could be exemplified with the following account: ”Keeping a dog shut-in affects its 
natural behavior too. Horses, for example, they are flock-living animals that go long distances 
every day, to fence them in small areas and to make them stand in a box at night is as much an 
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impact on them as that we have pigs in small spaces indoors.” This quote relates to what 
another inspector described as “looking at whether the animals can lead as natural lives as 
possible” which refers to the fourth paragraph in the Swedish animal welfare legislation. The 
quote concerning the statutory treatment of horses reveals the epistemic tension between the 
inspector’s knowledge and the extended implication of the legislation; that it is judicially 
considered “natural” to keep a horse in a box for many hours every day. I argue that these 
kinds of tensions evoke frustrations such as the ones expressed in the following quotes: “Then 
I can get angry – when a pet owner neglects an obviously important commitment.” Or “it is 
authority obstinacy; how difficult can it be to fix some of this stuff?” These quotes uttered in 
relation to the noting of the low level of demands in the legislation reveals how inspectors are 
emotionally triggered by the omissions by animal owners. The legislation can not reach the 
animal owners even if the animals obviously could have a much better life, in the words of 
another inspector: ”There are many who are just on the verge of non-compliance with the 
animal welfare legislation, they are doing everything correctly and they really stay [just on the 
limit] so we cannot do anything; we cannot find any shortcomings or anything but it is just on 
the verge [almost miserable].” 
The legislation is paradoxical in a further sense since it arbitrarily differentiates the 
needs of animals that in fact share the same needs. For example when asking an inspector on 
why cows can be tied up in the same spot twentyfour/seven the whole winter in compliance 
with the legislation while other species can not, the inspector replied: “If it had been a horse, 
one would think that it was terrible.” This quote was followed by an explanation by the 
inspector noting that in accordance with contemporary scientific knowledge on the needs of 
cows, their leg and hoof health improves if they can move around freely.  
In this section I have presented some central conditions and situations framing the day-
to-day animal welfare practice. The conditions demanding emotion management identified 
are the exposure to animal and human suffering and various tense situations causing 
psychosocial stress. Thereto, epistemic tensions challenge inspectors and lead to feelings of 
inadequacy. In relation to the identified challenges, I now move on to analyze how inspectors 
manage emotions, not least their own, in relation to the aim of improving the welfare of 
animals and to the conditions and situations that frame these endeavors. 
Empathy work by animal welfare inspectors  
It is all [progressive animal welfare inspection] about bringing in people who are empathic. 
(Jenny, 30+) 
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This quote, referring to the need of employing empathic people into the animal welfare 
profession, can be argued to exemplify a general notion among my participants; empathy is 
viewed as a crucial capability in animal welfare inspection. The many accounts on the 
importance of empathy cohere with the experiences I have drawn from extensive shadowing 
sessions. In this section, I will argue that empathy is a capability with multicolored 
professional implications and functions used both to understand, evaluate and act upon 
situations and conditions arising in animal welfare cases. Further, I will argue that empathy is 
something that is consciously done and cultivated in the practice of animal welfare inspection; 
inspectors perform empathy work both in relation to animals and humans but not least in 
relation to their own emotional and cognitive processes. The following discussion aims to 
shed light on the question of how animal welfare inspectors manage and work with emotions 
in relation to their working conditions. 
Instrumental empathy work 
Arguably, empathy work comprises several necessary functions in the tasks of animal welfare 
inspectors. Empathy work I define as a conscious employment of empathy that can be used in 
relation to a case in order to achieve the overarching goal of animal welfare interventions; to 
make a difference to the better for the animals involved. In this sense, empathy work can be 
understood as instrumental. 
Firstly, empathy work is used to understand the situation of animals and humans in a 
case (compare with Wettergren & Bergman Blix, 2016). This can be illustrated by the 
following quote from an inspector: “This was bad, it was almost on the verge. But you know, 
they probably still pay for that huge new building.” This quote was uttered when leaving a 
farm where the animal owner did not show much compliance even if an animal was clearly 
sick and injured without having been given care. The comment on house mortgage from the 
inspector suggests that there is an understanding to the economically pressured situation of 
many farmers that in turn may cause tensions manifested in the inspection setting. The 
inspector notices that there are pressures on the farmer from several angles and that this can 
explain the stubborn attitude. Thus, an understanding of the case takes form. I also suggest 
that the understanding becomes a means for the inspector to balance the own emotional 
responses. The inspector was clearly frustrated after the inspection saying: “this was a damn 
shithole”, however, the immediate response was to contrast this utterance by the 
understanding exemplified above. Thus, empathy work, also involves the management of the 
inspectors’ own emotions. 
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A similar kind of performance of empathy work to understand a case is substantial also 
in pet animal inspections: “In animal husbandry, the human life story is important in order to 
assess whether a change is possible.” And further: “We have to find reasons for why animal 
husbandry is lacking” These quotes refers to allowing the inspected to share their life story; 
letting them be heard is important in order to evaluate whether a case can result in the desired 
change for the animal or if it will lead to forced custody of the animals. 
In addition to understanding the human situation, empathy work is performed in order 
to understand the situation of animals: “It is not always the sickest animals that affect you the 
most. It can for example be lonely animals that create the most concern.” The quote refers to 
finding a lonely dog, and arguably suggests that empathy work can enable imagination of 
implicit and tacit suffering. This seeing capability is both cognitive in the sense that the 
inspector has knowledge on specific animal breeds that suggests that social interaction and 
certain stimuli is necessary for the well-being of the animal. But the seeing capability is also 
affective in the sense that inspectors can sense the distress of the animal beyond the cognitive 
understanding and further translate this affective sensing into empathic imagination (compare 
with Björk, 2017). That is, the inspectors can use the sensing of distress and knowledge to 
imagine the situation for the animal, something I suggest the following quote confirms: 
“Partly, it is about getting a feel for the animal and what I can see and my knowledge.” This 
combination of conscious emotional sensibility and cognitive application seems fundamental 
to create understanding in some cases. Similar observations reoccurred continuously 
throughout my fieldwork. In the words of another inspector on how getting to open the door 
to the stable can be the first way to get the picture of the animal welfare status on a farm: “I 
want to get to open the door to the stable and feel the first smell, you can sometimes 
immediately determine if there are animals feeling bad.” Further, another inspector on the 
encounter with suffering animals: “In some sense, it goes straight into the emotional, the fact 
that there is actually suffering here.” 
Another example of how empathy work allows inspectors to understand a case both in 
relation to animals and humans can be illustrated by a discussion on a slaughterhouse case 
between two inspectors. One of the inspectors had inspected a slaughterhouse and wanted 
some consultation from a colleague on technical aspects of the regulation. The inspectors 
double-checked a number confirming that 134 animals were killed each minute, a number that 
raised doubt on how well the workers responsible for controlling the various steps of the 
slaughter could manage regulated criterions such as anaesthetization and death confirmation. 
Since the animals are killed by getting their throats slit mechanically, the anesthetics must be 
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verified before the killing. Further, when the throats are slit there must be verification that the 
animals are actually dead, to insure that they do not suffer from technical faults. This had 
occurred in another case where animals had been grabbling around in their own blood because 
of anesthetic failures. Only one slaughterhouse employee was supposed to manage the various 
control tasks. With 134 animals per minute swishing along the conveyor belt in front of the 
employee, the inspectors concluded that it seemed highly unlikely or even impossible that 
regulation could be followed. The inspector that had visited the slaughter house noted several 
stressful circumstances for the animals and continued: “It is not exactly cozy to be in that 
environment, there are so many impressions. The treatment is quite bad, a lot of stress for the 
animals; it is simply too much for them.” The amount of impressions, seemingly 
overwhelming in the account of the inspector, is used to imagine the situation of the animals. 
The quote exemplifies the performance of empathy work; the inspector both use her own 
experience of the stressful amount of impressions as well as her knowledge on the animals 
ability to experience stress, in order to draw the conclusion that “it is too much for them”. The 
accompanying inspector continuously confirmed the reasoning by her colleague by similar 
empathic comments, thus creating a collective and relational dialogue that implicitly 
cultivates empathy as a guiding capability. Once again I perceive the imaginative tool of 
empathy to be in play and working as in in Björk’s study on parents and children relations 
(2017). Thereto, this example of performing empathy touches upon and extends previous 
research by Holmberg (2008, 2011) as it both illustrates the activating of empathy by 
cognition and experience, both allows us to understand how empathy towards animals is 
cultivated relationally between the inspectors.  
Empathy work also guides the expressed understanding of the employees’ situation: 
“You will probably become quite numb by standing there all day long.” This quote shows the 
understanding of that if you witness the death of 134 animals each minute, this will probably 
have consequences on your affective responses; thus, the inspector suggests that there is a 
harshness to the working conditions of the employees. Accordingly, understanding the case is 
arguably made possible by empathy work both in relation to animals and humans. 
Secondly, empathy work is used to evaluate a case. In this sense, empathy work helps 
inspectors to “determine the right response”, which previous research have identified as a 
dilemma in inspection (Devitt et al., 2014). Understanding is viewed here as a precondition 
for evaluation and as such the two are merging. However, there is an analytical difference that 
Wettergren and Bergman Blix (2016) previously have touched upon. For example, the 
inspectors usually have to get a feel for the inspected to see if they are willing to comply. This 
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is part of the understanding of a case but is more concretely “testing out” the inspected. This 
can be illustrated by the following questions asked by an inspector to an animal owner after 
inspecting a farm with several animal welfare omissions: “the surface here is not dry, do you 
think the animals need a dry bed to lay on?” and further: “does this seem reasonable to you?, 
do you think you will manage?” Both questions were asked after letting the greater picture 
fall into place first, that is, there was already an established understanding of the case before 
these questions where put forward. In my analysis, these questions serve to evaluate whether 
there will be an effort made by the animal owner. Further, the evaluation is made possible by 
the sensing and understanding of the situation by the conscious empathy work of the 
inspector. In the words of another inspector: “We try to build up a motivation in [the animal 
owners] to make a change but sometimes you have the feeling that this will take a bad ending 
anyway”. I suggest that the “feeling” is an example of empathic imagination, affective and 
cognitive, that becomes an evaluative tool for deciding how to proceed in a case.   
Thirdly, empathy work is performed in order to act upon various aspects of a case. In 
the words of an very experienced inspector that have gone from field to primarily office work: 
“I know that when I was out on control, I was very sad that I could not do more, the lowest 
level is so low, one can see that the animals are not well but still cannot do anything. Animals 
covered in feces that are bound up without being able to scratch themselves, this goes on day 
in and day out and it burns and scratches their skin. So when you can do something, you look 
at it properly.” This quote demonstrates how the empathic imagination guides the motivation 
to act when judicially possible. It also shows how the boundaries of the legislation are 
contradicting the empathic imagination of the inspector. To connect this to the discussion on 
epistemic tensions is to recognize how the same empathic imagination that reveals the 
epistemic paradoxes of the legislation becomes a motivation to change the animals’ situation.  
Altruistic empathy work 
If instrumental empathy work can be said to be a tool that guides the work of animal welfare 
inspectors, altruistic empathy is the foreground in which inspectors cultivate and nurture 
empathic capabilities. Altruistic empathy is here contrasted to instrumental empathy where 
the former is not seen as oriented towards a goal but rather a capability cultivated in the 
working group. However, these are just roughly drawn differences that should not be over-
emphasized; the two concepts merge. Nonetheless I find the differences relevant to 
understand the distinction between performing a professionally oriented emotion–cognitive 
work and to cultivate a general empathic approach. For example, inspectors tend to show 
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understanding of the inspecteds’ perspectives in various ways. One inspector commented that: 
“I can understand that they have a fear of non-objective inspectors.” And another inspector 
that: “It is probably experienced in a completely different way by those who are inspected.” 
Both referring to the somewhat exposed situation of the inspected. Another inspector 
comments on the, sometimes, extensive economical pressure on farmers: “it is unpleasant 
being out inspecting when you know that people are deep down in the mud.” An additional 
example illustrates how an inspector frames the reaction to encountering people that have 
various difficulties in terms of empathy: “you feel empathy, compassion for the destiny of 
life, for the human being.” Further comments from inspectors notes the humbling experiences 
of seeing life conditions that are exposed: “The people we come to have none, it gets extra 
heavy, we take away all that they have; it gets to you”. These kinds of reflections are 
circulated backstage amongst colleagues; inspectors collectively confirm empathic 
capabilities as crucial during meetings and informal debriefing. Such collective backstage 
cultivation of empathy becomes manifested front stage when inspectors perform empathy in 
order to make inspections less strain for animal owners: “when on inspection I joke with the 
animal owner and try to stay calm and get a feel for the situation” (field note, Anja, 40+). This 
illustrates how the cultivation of understanding gets practiced in the field. Anja knows that 
inspections can be very strenuous for the animal owner and therefore use this knowledge both 
to joke and ease up tensions but also to be calm and sensitive in relation to the situation. This 
can also help to overcome tensions from the power position of the inspector. Further, altruistic 
empathy can be performed by giving confirmation of animal owners that are stressed, which 
the following quote by Martha (30+) shows: “we understand that this can be a big break in 
your way of living”. 
Likewise, the inspectors express, cultivate and perform empathy towards animals. 
Sometimes explicitly, as when Bill (60+) said: “it is important to have empathy for the 
animals”, referring to that the main purpose of animal welfare inspection is to make the lives 
of animals better. According to Bill, this requires that inspectors care for and understand 
animals. Thus, I argue, making oneself sensible to and getting a feel for animals, as 
previously theorized by Hansson and Jacobsson (2014) and Holmberg ( 2008, 2011), is held 
to be a generally important empathic capability by Bill, which also was confirmed by 
participants in general. This is shown in practice as inspector’s stress that all animals are to be 
treated as sentient individuals.  
Thus far, I have argued that various forms of empathy work emerge in the collected 
material as a significant pattern. The analysis reveals that empathy is performative; it is learnt, 
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cultivated and acted upon socially, rather than a hardwired automated capacity and response. I 
suggest that the doing of empathy is crucial to understand an animal welfare case – where 
empathy is performed both in relation to animals and humans – evaluating the possibilities of 
change. It is also crucial for finding the appropriate responses in relation to the situations and 
conditions that define animal welfare practice. But not least, empathy has also been shown to 
be a way to take care of emotions produced in animal welfare inspection; by cultivation of an 
empathic environment where both the inspectors as well as the animal owners emotional 
responses are allowed. So how then, I ask, can the inspectors uphold the empathy work 
through the challenges of their daily work? This leads me to the next step in the analysis that 
investigates emotion management relating to empathy work. 
Emotion management relating to empathy work 
My argument builds on the premise that in order to use ones emotions in work – to perform 
emotion work – one need to manage the emotions that such work evokes. Thus, to maintain 
empathy work over time, inspectors have to perform different kinds of emotion management. 
The concepts procedural correctness (Wettergren, 2010) and ventilation (Jacobsson & 
Lindblom, 2013, 2016) have previously been used to understand management of various 
emotional challenges and dilemmas. I will analyze my data with help of these concepts in 
order to further investigate the question: how animal welfare inspectors manage and work 
with emotions in relation to their working conditions. 
Bureaucratic procedures 
I suggest that empathy work needs boundaries in order to be maintained. Arguably, 
bureaucratic procedures can constitute such boundaries. Procedural management of emotions 
enables inspectors to sustain empathy by having a certain distance in relation to the animals 
and humans they encounter. Distancing is especially required when attending demanding 
cases. Speaking about such cases Josefine (50+) says: “Deal with them briefly and correctly.” 
The quote is a management instruction on how to deal with what inspectors call “dogmatists” 
– a recurring challenge for animal welfare inspectors. The term “dogmatist” refers to animal 
owners that claim their legislative right beyond reasonable limits. Being “correct” means that 
one follows the bureaucratic procedures and treat animal owners equally. Being “brief and 
correct”, to not engage more than necessary, is an emotion management technique required 
when the possibility of empathy work is exhausted and implies that inspectors contain their 
emotions by performing bureaucracy. This argument is informed by the previously discussed 
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research by Wettergren (2010) suggesting that procedural correctness can be a way to 
override undesired emotions. That is, when one cannot manage a case by empathy work one 
can at least find comfort and pride in being correct in relation to the given procedure. The 
pride in maintaining the role of a calm and correct bureaucratic official is exemplified in the 
following quote:  
He [an animal owner] accuses me of all kinds of things and he has also been threatening me. He is 
really the kind of person you could go tough on if that is your purpose [to act upon personal 
emotions of irritation or revenge]. But no, he will get the same treatment as everyone else. 
(Martha, 30+) 
In this quote an inspector describes the management of personal emotions of resentment by 
letting the principle of equal treatment, here understood as a specific expression of procedural 
correctness, guide her work in relation to a demanding client. The inspector empathizes that 
she will not be provoked by the personal attacks but instead act correctly in the role of a 
government official. Procedural correctness can also be performed with police assistance: 
“you [the inspector] are nice and correct and the police may bark [speak up] when needed.” 
This quote demonstrates how inspectors can uphold their bureaucratic role while the police 
enforce compliance.  
Another bureaucratic phenomenon in animal welfare inspection is the categorization of 
animals as production animals and pets. I argue that this categorization enables the inspectors 
to emotionally manage the consequences that the paradoxical regulation has for individual 
animals. Such managing is made possible by the tacit and internalized nature of the 
categorization, which can be exemplified with the following quote:  
We might not react that strongly if we inspect a poultry farm and find a dead chicken, that is part 
of the system. But if we find a dead dog while inspecting a kennel we would probably react more 
and think that it is much worse. (John, 40+) 
The inspector continued telling me that these kinds of immediate reactions had been discussed 
amongst colleagues as weird and contradictive since they know that all animals are 
individuals capable of suffering. The “system” refers to the industrial production of animal 
products (meat, eggs, dairy products etc.) and its surrounding cultural structure. Even if the 
inspectors are formally supposed to treat all animals as individuals, this is practically 
impossible since the resources in animal welfare inspection are scarce. If inspectors visit a 
farm with thousands of animals, they do not have nearly as much time as when visiting a farm 
with twenty animals. Thus, in practice, empathy work cannot involve thousands of individuals 
since there is not enough time. Instead of inspecting each individual on such large farms, 
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inspectors told me that they have to look for the blatant deviances and that this could be 
frustrating and stressful. 
I am not suggesting that inspectors consciously apply the terms product and pet in order 
to manage the frustration of not being able to supervise the needs of each individual animal. 
Rather, the division between product and pet is a broader cultural phenomenon that implicitly 
undergirds the emotion management process for inspectors. As the respondent John said in 
the quote above, his “reaction” differs even if it contradicts his knowledge that chickens are as 
able to suffer as dogs. Social norms and legal regulation makes it accepted to treat animals 
differently, and thereby enable inspectors to feel that what they do is correct in relation to 
given procedures. In this way the epistemic tensions identified earlier are managed by the 
performance of procedural correctness. In some cases, however, the inspectors’ emotions 
override the bureaucratic procedures.  
For instance, two participants described that they act outside their professional role in 
order to help animals. They told me about a disagreement in the work group concerning 
whether putting down animals should be considered a way to improve a situation. On the one 
hand, it was argued that there is no harm for the individual to be put down if it is done without 
suffering. Thus, in cases where animals cannot be transferred to new homes, putting them 
down can be viewed as a potential option. This option is sometimes used (in accordance with 
the legislation) since the government funds for animal welfare do not provide transferring 
programs3 for all animals that need it. On the other hand, the two participants telling me about 
the dispute were clearly against this argument, raising questions like: “how can a life not be 
worth more? We do not see it as an improvement for the animal to be killed.” The inspectors 
continued telling me that they sometimes act outside the boundaries of their professional role 
and contact animal homes to save individuals that would otherwise get put down. In this 
example we see how emotions are managed by not subjecting personal emotive-cognitive 
assessments to the ones prescribed by procedural correctness. 
Backstage and front stage ventilation 
Ventilation, as theorized by Jacobsson and Lindblom (2013, 2016), is another emotion 
management technique practiced by inspectors. Ventilation describes the “need to give vent to 
built-up tension and irritation” (Jacobsson & Lindblom, 2013: 61). Inspectors consciously and 
unconsciously use ventilation backstage (amongst colleagues and in office) in order to 
                                                
3 Transferring program refer to the process of giving an animal a new home in cases where its owner can not 
take care of it. 
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maintain the empathy work performed front stage (during inspections and encounters with 
clients). During inspections, the car turned out to be a pressure chamber for backstage 
ventilation as exemplified by the following quotes: 
You shut down your emotions [when inspecting] but when you close the door to the car [when 
inspection is over] the feelings arise. (Jenny, 30+) 
I am thinking thru the inspection when it is over, you cannot cry or get angry until you get to the 
car. (Robin, 30+) 
When we got into the car after the inspection we felt completely drained – it was this farmer, 
questioning everything you said. (Alice, 30+) 
The car is perceived as a space where one can allow emotions to be expressed or to simply 
arise – a space where emotions are vented, that is, emotional pressure and tensions are 
released. Inspectors continuously refer to “debriefing in the car”, meaning the reflection upon 
experiences and situations during inspections in order to deal with cognitive and emotional 
strains. Such debriefing also serves as a means to improve treatment of clients. “Debriefing in 
the car” can also refer to pre-inspection ventilation as exemplified in the following field note:  
– Now I suddenly feel a little pain in my stomach, says one of the inspectors. – Me too, the other 
inspector replies. It gets completely quiet in the car as we wait to start the inspection. We are 
parked outside the house of a pet owner that might lose her animal if she has not complied with 
requirements put forward in a previous inspection. When confronted with the requirements, the pet 
owner demonstrated that she was prepared to commit suicide if the animal would be taken from 
her. (Field note) 
As we see, inspectors can prepare for an inspection by venting their feelings. In their own 
words, sharing their feelings “calibrates” them and prepares them for the encounter with the 
animal owner. To “calibrate” or “prepare in the car” is a commonly used description amongst 
participants on how collegial interaction is shaped in the field. The continuous need to vent 
implies that working in pairs can be beneficial: “It is easier to punctuate [blow out or vent] 
oneself if there are two of you” (Bill, 60+). This statement underlines the relational aspect of 
ventilation – a general pattern in my data suggesting that ventilation is primarily something 
done together in a reflective way rather than a spontaneous outburst of feelings or thoughts. 
Ventilation serves the purpose of reducing tensions and to create openness concerning the 
frustrations felt, which in turn enable inspectors to uphold their professional and 
empathetically oriented approach towards animal owners. That is, by making emotions and 
thoughts visible to one another, the inspectors can reflect on and improve their work together 
for the benefit of the animals, clients and themselves.  
In contrast, front stage ventilation is a means to directly release tensions, used to 
communicate the seriousness of a situation to animal owners: 
 25 
You tell the animal owner that: ‘this is bad; can you not see this [miserable condition for the 
animals] yourself? This is not acceptable.’ I am very clear about what I think [in relation to the 
animal owner]. (Elisabeth, 40+)  
The quote illustrates how immediate ventilation takes place in response to the acuteness of 
animals suffering. The inspector act out her emotive-cognitive reaction, thereby release 
tensions of frustration. The quote also shows how expressing ones thoughts and feelings can 
serve as a pedagogical means to communicate the seriousness of a situation. Accordingly, 
empathy work can be complemented or replaced by front stage ventilation when required. 
There are further accounts supporting this conclusion:  
You can also use anger, because some people are so blocked [lost in their own perspective] that 
you have to use anger to provoke them so that they get angry and thus lose their tensions. (Martha, 
30+) 
The quote exemplifies how the inspector uses her own frustration in order to create a 
ventilation reaction from the animal owner. According to the inspector one can consciously 
provoke emotional reactions from the animal owner in order to open up a dialogue in cases 
where animal owners are unwilling to listen. However, the inspector also told me that one 
cannot become too angry since that would undermine a good dialogue. This is particularly 
interesting since it suggests that ventilation can be performed in a conscious and balanced 
way; to release tension in the inspector and in the animal owner, but also as a technique to 
open up for dialogue. By mutually displaying the emotions at stake – by putting the cards on 
the table – the inspector and animal owner can have a discussion. Thus, front stage ventilation 
is a specific emotion management technique in empathy work. 
When provoking a ventilation reaction from the animal owner the inspector has to 
perform containing; the inspector has to be the space for the emotional reactions of the 
inspected (compare with: Jacobsson & Lindblom, 2013: 60). Being the space for animal 
owners emotional reactions connects to the understanding part of empathy work exemplified 
above. When letting the inspected be heard, the inspector perform containing: 
We are at an inspection site together with a police patrol. Some animals have been reported to be 
neglected by the animal owner who has been identified as a risk profile; potentially able to assault 
the inspectors. It turns out that no one is home, however, the inspector gets hold of the owner by 
phone. The animal owner sounds moody, sometimes verbally attacking the inspector, sometimes 
talking normally. The phone call ends without any progression. Later the same day the animal 
owner calls the inspector, now in a completely different mood and willing to talk. The inspector 
patiently listens for over thirty minutes as the person talks fragmentary about her life story and all 
kinds of things. (Field note, Martha)  
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As shown in the field note, Martha is the space for the personal attacks and the animal owners 
need to be heard. As the animal owner ventilates, Martha contains. Martha later told me that 
listening is an essential tool to progress in a case. 
Concluding discussion 
In this article, I have argued that psychosocial stress and epistemic tensions are central 
challenges in the day-to-day work of animal welfare inspectors. Several of my findings allow 
us to understand how inspectors manage these challenges.  
To begin with, I have used previous research on empathy and emotion to construct a 
new analytical tool – empathy work – to be used to understand how one can collectively and 
individually work with and manage emotions by empathy.  
Second, by drawing on previous research on empathy (e.g. Björk, 2017; Wettergren & 
Blix, 2016) the concept instrumental empathy work helps to explain how an animal welfare 
case can be understood, evaluated and acted upon. Inspectors emotionally tune into and get a 
feel for animals and humans in a case in order to determine what action to take. Thus, I have 
extended previous research on animal welfare inspection by answering how inspectors 
“determine the appropriate response” (Devitt et al., 2014: 6–7) both in relation to the animal 
and human subjects in a case. Thereto, I have shown how empathic imagination, previously 
used to understand crucial capabilities in parent-child relations (Björk, 2017), can be used to 
analyze how humans can perform empathy in order to understand animals. 
Third, I have argued that altruistic empathy work is the foreground in which inspectors 
collectively develop their empathic capabilities. Whilst instrumental empathy work is goal 
oriented, altruistic empathy work is the individual and collegial nurturing and cultivation of 
empathy that imprint the day-to-day practice of animal welfare inspection. Thus, I have 
shown how previous research on how animal right activists “learn to be affected” (Hansson & 
Jacobsson, 2014) also can be used to understand how professionals cultivate sensibility and 
empathy towards animals. Thus, I have sought to develop Holmberg’s theorization (2008, 
2011) on how empathy in relation to animals is performed and learnt in professional settings. 
Fourth, when the possibilities of empathy work is exhausted, when cases are especially 
challenging and in relation to general tensions at work, inspectors use bureaucratic 
procedures to manage emotions. The performance of procedural correctness (Wettergren, 
2010) allow inspectors to feel pride in doing a good job by overriding undesired emotions 
caused by psychosocial stress and epistemic tensions. Further, bureaucratic procedures 
manifested as the categorization of production and pet animals are connected to social norms 
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and legislative regulations that make it accepted to treat animals differently, and thereby 
enable inspectors to feel that what they do is correct in relation to given procedures.  
Fifth, drawing on previous research on emotion work by ventilation (Jacobsson & 
Lindblom, 2013), the concept backstage ventilation helps us understand how inspectors 
uphold empathy work. The car was shown to be a ventilation space where inspectors can 
allow emotions to be expressed or to simply arise – a space where emotions are vented – 
emotional pressure and tensions are released. Thereby, the inspectors can reflect on and 
improve their work. Front stage ventilation helps us to understand how inspectors 
immediately release tension but also how emotional reactions can communicate the 
seriousness of a situation. Thereto, provoking a ventilation reaction from the inspected 
releases tensions during inspection and can enable a good dialogue. Thus, I have shown how 
ventilation can be understood, not only as an emotion work technique of activists (Jacobsson 
& Lindblom, 2013), but also as a professional tool used to uphold empathy work over time. 
Sixth, my study have raised and left many questions on the working conditions of 
animal inspectors unanswered. For example, risks, normative aspects of inspection and 
several other themes were identified during the initial analyses but were not developed. The 
analyses of such themes could render additional understanding to the subject of animal 
welfare inspection and is a task for further research.  
Finally, the new analytical tool, empathy work, could be further developed and used to 
understand how emotional challenges are managed in other professions, in activism and social 
movements in which emotions are situated in between the subjects and objects involved. 
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